Irvine Housing Blog

Irvine Housing Blog

Link to Irvine Housing Blog

A detailed look at Irvine Village premiums by Global Decision and IHB

Posted: 06 Jul 2011 03:30 AM PDT

Which Irvine neighborhoods does the market consider the most desirable? Personal opinions aside, the market has spoken, and we have the results.

Irvine Home Address ... 60 CEZANNE Irvine, CA 92603
Resale Home Price ......  $2,100,000

You can be better than that
Don't let it get the better of you
What could be better than now
Life's not about what's better

John Butler Trio -- Better Than

Which Irvine Village is the most desirable for single family homes?

Which Irvine Village is the best, and how could this be determined? Well, taking an opinion poll might be interesting, but it wouldn't be backed by anything substantial. To determine what people really believe about desirability, we have to look where people put their money. Money talks. The neighborhoods where people pay the most for real estate determines what is "best."

Determining which neighborhood obtains the highest premiums is not easy. We couldn't simple look to the MLS or to past sales and see where the prices are highest because there can be many reasons people pay more in one neighborhood versus another. To accurately measure premium, we needed to normalize for other factors to distill a premium value not explainable by other factors.

In the first post in this series, An accurate view of the Irvine housing market by Global Decision and IHB, I introduced Jaysen Gilespie of Global Decision. "Jaysen Gillespie of Global Decision, an analytics and consulting firm that has worked in the real estate industry. He shares my interest in determining what is really going on in the real estate market. As a professional data analyst, he is trained in special techniques I cannot perform." The first post was well recieved. Jaysen's skills with data analysis are remarkable, and I am thrilled he is working with me and the IHB to bring this information to the readership.

The following is the writing of Jaysen Gillespie. I have not set it off in block quote to make it easier to read.

A presentation by Jaysen Gillespie of Global Decision

info@globaldecision.com

Global Decision is an analytics consulting firm.  While our methods are not industry-specific, our engagements are skewed towards specific industries in Southern California, such as real estate (along with online gaming and restaurant chains).  We specialize in applying both foundational and advanced analytics to better understand business and economic issues.

Today’s post is part two of our series on hedonic housing valuation in Irvine.  The goal of a hedonic housing valuation model is to use all information about a sale, including both the sale price and the characteristics of the home (number of beds, number of baths, square footage, etc.) to understand how the home’s value is derived from its constituent parts.  Wikipedia offers a good overview of hedonic regression or see the Global Decision tutorial on how to build your own hedonic regression model.

What is a mathematical model?

A mathematical model is an abstraction of a real-world situation.  Models help us understand how complex systems work by distilling them down to a manageable number of inputs, and they provide the ability to tinker with the model – and see how the system responds.  In our case, the “system” under consideration is the Irvine, CA housing market.  The hedonic model helps us do two things:  first, it deepens our understanding of the drivers of housing demand.  Second, it allows us to play with hypothetical scenarios and see what the impact would be on the value of a property.

How would someone in the “real world” use a hedonic housing model?

A fun aspect of building and using mathematical models is that you can perform experiments that would be physically or financially impossible in the real world.   Because “neighborhood” or “area” is an input into the hedonic housing model, we could theoretically pick up a house from Woodbury and move it to Woodbridge (keeping all else equal) and see how the value of the property changes.  For those engaged in building new homes, or developing a plan for a new neighborhood, an accurate hedonic housing model can be used to optimize revenue.  If you know the incremental revenue you can obtain from an extra bedroom, an extra bathroom, or an extra 1000 sq. ft. of lot size, you can compare the costs of each option with the resulting expected increase in valuation and find the best bang-for-the-buck.  It’s not an exact science, and I wouldn’t execute blindly based on just the results of a model.  But a well-structured model can provide valuable insight and an unbiased view into the marketplace’s preferences.

How are neighborhoods modeled in the Irvine Hedonic Housing Model?

With Irvine it’s really a case of “the hits just keep on coming.”  Not only do we have a background of glasslike consistency, especially in terms of education and safety, but we also have large, well-defined neighborhoods.  Some locals refer to them as villages, though they have no governmental or political authority.   Each village is similar, in that it was constructed in the same range of years, has access to many shared facilities, and generally sports a consistent look-and-feel throughout.

In regression models, there are generally two types of explanatory factors – continuous and categorical (discrete).  Continuous factors can take on any value, or perhaps any integer value.  Examples include the age of a property, the square footage, and the lot size.  Categorical factors typically have either well-defined and finite possibilities or have a practical limit on their range.  In theory the number of rooms in a home is continuous.  You could construct a home with 700 of them.  Unless you have the resources of Louis XIV, it’s probably not going to happen.  So we’d consider the number of rooms in a home to be categorical for practical reasons. 

If a categorical variable is numeric in nature, we can – at our option – use that number directly as an input into the underlying regression model.  Treating a categorical numeric variable as a continuous variable makes sense when incrementing the factor by one has about the same impact.  In our model, we treat the number of bedrooms and bathrooms as continuous, even though there is a finite range for these values. 

An area designation, by contrast, can’t be directly fed into a regression model.  It’s not numeric, and the model has no conceptual understanding of “Woodbridge” vs. “Oak Creek.”  Fortunately, there are well-developed methods for handling these types of variables.  The crux of the solution requires us to do two things:  first, we must pick a baseline level for each category.  In our example, we use “Northwood-Old” as our baseline area.  After the regression is run, the baseline becomes the reference level against which others are measured.  A good baseline contains a lot of data points and is preferably an area of average value. 

Once we have a baseline level (Northwood-Old), we can model all other levels as extra variables in the regression.  Continuing our example, we’d set up a variable called “Woodbridge.”  Homes in Woodbridge get a “1” for that variable; others get a “0.”  We benefit here from Irvine’s village system.  Because villages are quite large, we need introduce only a small number of extra variables (16 in our case) into the regression model.

So what will the hedonic housing model tell me about neighborhoods?

The output of the hedonic model will tell the analyst how much more (or less) a home would be worth if that home were moved from the baseline area (Northwood-Old) to the area designated by each area variable.  The virtual move from Northwood-Old to another neighborhood assumes all else is held constant.  So if you start with a 3/2, 1600 sq.ft. home from 1977 in Northwood-Old and move it to Woodbridge, you’d gain (or lose) the dollar amount stipulated by the Woodbridge variable’s coefficient. 

The model assumes all else holds constant.  In reality, the model can only hold constant the factors that are directly input into the model.  So if you use the model to move a home from Turtle Rock down to University Park, and you lose a city lights view in doing so, the model will revalue the home lower – but miss the fact that the view disappeared.  Views, backing up to Culver, having Metrolink as your neighbor, or owning a strangely shaped lot are all examples of factors not in the model.  In the future, it may be possible to add this type of data into the Irvine Hedonic Housing Model.  A parcel map and GIS system would be able to determine if the property is located next to a major negative (I-405, for example). 

The above chart represents the results of the Irvine Hedonic Housing Model, run on 2007-2011 data (so that all neighborhoods could have sales in that time frame).

Important but statistical side note:  regression methods provide a best estimate of the impact of each area on home values.  For the above analysis, our margin of error for each estimate varies by neighborhood.  This “standard error” ranges from 0.7% to 1.9%.  Areas with standard error greater than 1.4% are shown in lighter blue.  There is a 68% chance that the true impact of the area on market value falls within 1 standard error of the quoted best estimate, rising to 95% when the band is expanded to 2 standard errors.  For this reason, we might say that Portola Springs and Northpark are statistically similar in their impact on value, but we are more sure that Columbus Grove (CG) has the lowest incremental market value.  Even if the true CG value was 3.8% greater (2 standard errors), CG would still create a decline of 6.1% in market value.  The 6.1% might put it in contention only with Orangetree and West Irvine in a statistical analysis.  The standard error decreases as more data is accrued, so new neighborhoods are more subject to statistical swing.

The premiums for each area, relative to Northwood-Old, are listed on the chart.  These values are not a human judgment of any type, and are derived directly from the relationship between the physical area of the home, the other factors in the regression model (beds, baths, sqft, lotsize, etc.) and the selling price of the home.  The above result indicates how the market perceives each neighborhood in terms of valuation.

The general ordering of the areas should be of no surprise to area residents.  Turtle Ridge, Turtle Rock, and Quail Hill stand out as having high incremental market value.  Woodbridge is also a very solid performer and leads the pack of the older vintage flatland areas.  The El Camino Real / Walnut complex lacks an association in some areas and is of an older design, so one might speculate that those factors lead to its lower valuation.  It’s important to note that a property-based hedonic model does not tell you *why* each neighborhood is valued how it is – unless you have factors in the model that theorize the “why.” 

It’s up to the analyst to consider what might be the underlying root causes.  Models are a tool; some domain-specific knowledge is helpful in leveraging and interpreting their results.  Some theories are testable by adding additional variables to the underlying regression.  If, for example, we theorize that El Camino Real loses value because there is not enough park space, we could add in a variable with the number of square feet of parkland per housing unit.

Columbus Grove is a particularly interesting example.  It’s located on the fringe of Irvine, but within the bounds of the Irvine school district and enjoys all the other benefits of being in Irvine (i.e. safe, near jobs, climate, etc.).  However, the properties appear to sell for quite a discount to even an average area.  Such a result shows that newer is not sufficient to generate enhanced market value.

In the above chart, properties sold in Columbus Grove are in blue, with Woodbury in red.

It’s easy to see that properties in Columbus Grove (CGR), at the same size as those in Woodbury (WDB), sell for considerably less.  These 2-dimensional scatter plots are quick-and-easy tools to help verify that model results are sensible.  Given that CGR and WDB are both newer neighborhoods – and that the regression takes lot size and bed/bath configuration into account, it’s interesting that the market has valued Columbus Grove so much lower.

From the Case-Shiller Tiered indexes, we already know that area (for which price is a proxy) already plays a large role in determining how home values have performed after the housing bubble’s peak.  We’ve overlaid the Global Decision Irvine Hedonic Home Price Index on top of the Case-Shiller LAOC Tiered Value Indexes in the above graph.  While Case-Shiller’s Aggregate value is down almost 40%, there is a clear distinction between lower-end and higher-end results.  Case-Shiller’s High Tier is down only 30% from peak pricing.  Irvine SFRs are performing even better, with 15-20% declines since the Irvine peak in early 2006.

For the areas of Irvine that have more data, we can take a stab at computing a hedonic price index for just those specific villages.  We gain a finer level of granularity from doing so, but we lose statistical accuracy.  In the overall Irvine Hedonic Housing Model, a typical standard error for the price trend numbers is near 1%.  When we go area-by-area, those errors range from 1.5% to near 5%.

While all areas exhibit the same rapid rise, decent, and flattening trends, a few edge cases are worth a mention.  First, 5 of the 6 areas have the same overall increase from Jan 2000 to early 2006, about 140-150%.  Turtle Rock, however, is different.  Its peak value hits “only” 120% above the Jan 200 value.  Even more interesting, is that Turtle Rock did not experience nearly as much of a decline-from-peak as the other areas.  We don’t have enough data to do a meaningful hedonic price trend model for the other top-3 value add areas (Quail Hill and Turtle Ridge), but we know from Case-Shiller’s Tiered metrics that higher-end properties have held value better post-bubble.  Irvine is, itself, the higher-end of Case-Shiller’s Top Tier.  The decline in Irvine home values has averaged 15-20% vs. 30% for the LAOC Case-Shiller Top Tier.  Within Irvine, a high value area such as Turtle Rock appears to be experiencing even smaller declines.

Conversely, the area which rose the most in value (as a percentage of Jan 2000 values), is El Camino Real.  Interestingly, El Camino Real’s values have now dropped the most of any neighborhood in Irvine (in this analysis) after the bubble popped.  Again, the model cannot explain why – it could be a higher percentage of subprime loans, lower down payments, a change in consumer preferences, etc. 

Most areas, including Irvine as a whole, are now about 100% above the Jan 2000 prices.  Over 11.5 years, that’s a CAGR of 5.9%.  That’s a useful number to have, as it can help inform the debate about the future direction of home prices.  We can compare that 5.9% growth rate to other drivers of home value – average wage, job counts, new supply, persons per household, total households – to discuss whether current values represent a post bubble bottom or a landing on a stairway where another drop is forthcoming.

IrvineRenter's Commentary

I was not surprised to see Turtle Ridge and Turtle Rock at the top of the list, but the size of the premium was shocking to me. The same sticks and bricks are worth 40% more in these villages. Perhaps the premium views account for some of this (which also explains Quail Hill), but there are many non-view homes in these neighborhoods also obtaining substantial premiums.

I was also surprised to see Northwood Pointe and surrounding areas did not receive a higher premium. I would have guessed that Northwood Pointe was on par with Turtle Rock and Turtle Ridge, but it isn't. I was also surprized that Woodbury did not obtain a higher premium, that Woodbridge is more desirable than Westpark, and that University Park is more desirable than the old Northwood.

In my opinion, Columbus Grove represents the best value in Irvine. It feeds to the Irvine school district, the houses are nearly new, and yet it trades at a discount to the least desirable communities in Irvine. I imagine the Irvine Company would like to have everyone believe it is due to their superior land planning and community marketing. IMO, it's largely due to the fact that Lennar finished off the community and sold houses at a discount while the Irvine Company stopped construction to keep prices up. I believe Columbus Grove will rise in value relative to the less desirable Irvine communities of Walnut, El Camino Real, Orangetree and West Irvine.

The hedonic model showed than many of the undesirable areas exhibited the most volatile house prices. As mentioned above Turtle Rock didn't go up as much as other neighborhoods and didn't crash as hard either. On the other extreme is El Camino Real that went up a great deal and crashed more than other areas. This same phenomenon shows up in the general price tiers of Case-Shiller with the lowest price tier being the most volatile.

IMO, this volatility was largely the result of subprime lending and Option ARM financing. As lending standards were lowered during the bubble, more and more people qualifed to obtain loans. The fringes of the market (i.e. the lowest tier) should be the biggest beneficiary of an influx of new buyers. Turtle Rock wasn't being bid up by the 580 FICO score mob, El Camino Real was. Couple the influx of new buyers with the extreme leverage of Option ARMs, and the low end of the market gets pushed up substantially. The rest of the market is impacted by the move-ups with diffusion lessening the impact as you go up the housing ladder.

One of the factors that can never be modeled is human emotion and the variability of negotiation. For this reason, I don't believe it's possible to construct a model that can vary less than 5% from what the market actually does. Sometimes either the buyer or the seller is represented by a good agent who helps their client keep their emotions under control to make reasonable decisions. Sometimes not. Often either the buyer or the seller has motivations to complete the sale that have nothing to do with the real estate. Buyers can fall in love with a property and over bid, and sellers may need to move and lower their asking price aggresively to sell. People's emotions and negotiating skills will always represent a variable that can never be accurately modeled.

I want to thank Jaysen for this post. Next week, he will be back with a look at square footage, beds, baths, lot size, and other factors the strongly influence the prices of homes. Stay tuned.

Irvine's Turtle Ridge Premium

Never underestimate the power of zealots to sustain house prices. There is no metric by which the prices measured in Turtle Ridge make any sense, yet people keep paying the prices there. As distressed properties come to market, a buyer always seems to step up to pay off the Ponzi's debts.

I reasoned that Turtle Rock may not deflate much from it's bubble peaks because as an established community, there were fewer toxic loans there, and thereby there would be fewer distressed sales. Turtle Ridge was entirely built and sold during the bubble. People paid astronomical prices and borrowed huge sums to buy there. Despite the financial distress, prices have not fallen much, particularly at the high end.

What do you think? Will Turtle Ridge prices fall?

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
This property is no longer available for sale via the MLS.    
Please contact Shevy Akason, #01836707     
949.769.1599    
sales@idealhomebrokers.com   


Irvine House Address ...     60 CEZANNE Irvine, CA 92603    
Resale House Price ......   $2,100,000
    
Beds:  3    
Baths:  4    
Sq. Ft.:  3887    
$540/SF    
Property Type: Residential, Single Family    
Style: Two Level, Tuscan    
Year Built:  2004    
Community:  0    
County:  Orange   
MLS#:  S653380    
Source:  SoCalMLS    
Status:  Closed    
    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Welcome to your own Private Oasis in the Heart of Turtle Ridge. There has been no expense spared in this spacious Plan 3 in Chaumont. Upgrades include Venetian Plaster and Custom Paint throughout with recessed lighting. Fully Equipped Gourmet Kitchen comes with stainless steel appliances and opens to the Family Room. The family room has been upgraded with sliding glass doors that open onto the magnificent backyard. Fireplaces have been upgraded with sophisticated mantles and crushed glass. Three luxurious suites are located on the upper level with easy access to laundry. Master Bedroom comes with cozy Master Retreat and balcony overlooking the stunning landscaping. Surrounded by mature trees, this home is completely secluded with immaculate landscaping. The backyard comes with a spa and reverse infinity, salt water pool that cascades down over handpicked rocks. Custom Made Wrought Iron accents surround the estate while three crushed glass fire pits create a one of a kind environment.   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Proprietary IHB commentary and analysis  

Only in Irvine would someone pay $2,100,000 for a "plan 3," and only a realtor would have the nerve to say it's a "one of a kind environment." The perception of value is undeniable. Wether it's logical or not, the market makes it correct.
  
Resale Home Price ......     $2,100,000
House Purchase Price …    $1,542,500
House Purchase Date ....    3/31/2004
    
Net Gain (Loss) ..........    $431,500
Percent Change ..........    28.0%
Annual Appreciation …    4.1%
    
Cost of Home Ownership    
-------------------------------------------------    
$2,100,000 .......... Asking Price    
$420,000 .......... 20% Down Conventional    
4.59% ............... Mortgage Interest Rate    
$1,680,000 .......... 30-Year Mortgage    
$368,674 .......... Income Requirement     
    
$8,602 .......... Monthly Mortgage Payment     
$1820 .......... Property Tax (@1.04%)    
$708 .......... Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)    
$438 .......... Homeowners Insurance (@ 0.25%)    
$0 .......... Private Mortgage Insurance    
$280 .......... Homeowners Association Fees    
============================================    
$11,848 .......... Monthly Cash Outlays    
    
-$1581 .......... Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)    
-$2176 .......... Equity Hidden in Payment (Amortization)    
$721 .......... Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)    
$282 .......... Maintenance and Replacement Reserves    
============================================    
$9,094 .......... Monthly Cost of Ownership     
    
Cash Acquisition Demands    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
$21,000 .......... Furnishing and Move In @1%    
$21,000 .......... Closing Costs @1%    
$16,800 ............ Interest Points @1% of Loan    
$420,000 .......... Down Payment    
============================================    
$478,800 .......... Total Cash Costs    
$139,400 ............ Emergency Cash Reserves    
============================================    
$618,200 .......... Total Savings Needed    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   


real estate home sales


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Irvine Housing Blog

Irvine Housing Blog

Link to Irvine Housing Blog

Big banks foster false hope with lottery-style principal forgiveness

Posted: 05 Jul 2011 03:30 AM PDT

To give the hopeless a reason not to strategically default, several banks have singled out a few deeply underwater loan owners for principal forgiveness. By spreading news of their magnanimous deeds, they hope the remainder will keep paying.

Irvine Home Address ... 37 LONG Mdw #15 Irvine, CA 92620
Resale Home Price ......  $374,900

There are secrets that we still have left to find
There have been mysteries from the beginning of time
There are answers we're not wise enough to see

Five For Fighting -- The Riddle

Banks have a problem, a riddle they must solve. Twenty-five percent of their borrowers are underwater, and when you factor in second mortgages and sales commissions, more than half can't sell their homes without writing a check for the shortfall. And house prices are still going down. When homeowners have no equity, they are no longer homeowners, they are loan owners. If a loan owner's payments are less than the cost of a comparable rental, they have an incentive to stay and pay, but when the payment exceeds a comparable rental -- and the huge mortgage balances of the bubble make this common -- loan owners have an incentive to keep their money and strategically default on their mortgage.

Underwater loan owners have their names on title, and if they keep making payments long enough, amortization may catch them up, and prices may come back, so they may have equity again someday. The more their payments exceed the cost of rental, the further a loan owner is underwater, and the longer they perceive they will have to wait to have equity again, the more likely they are to give up and strategically default. If a loan owner strategically defaults, the lender is forced to make a choice; foreclose on the property when the resale value is worth less than the loan, or allow the loan owner to squat in the property. Neither choice is palatable to the lender.

Lenders have responded to these circumstances -- conditions the lenders created through irresponsible lending which inflated the housing bubble -- by using both a carrot and a stick to keep borrowers paying when it is in the best interest of the borrower to strategically default. The stick is the threat of foreclosure, debt collection, reduced access to credit in the future, and an appeal to morality. The specter of consequences to borrowers has been wildly exaggerated, and these circumstances are lessening by the day. The appeal to morality has been steadily eroding as borrowers are coming to realize they have a greater moral responsibility to their families than they have to their lenders.

Lenders threats of foreclosure have been neutralized by reports of delinquent mortgage squatters obtaining years of free rent. In fact, instead of being a deterrent to strategic default, the long foreclosure timelines have actually become an inducement. Lenders combat this perception with the use of terrorist tactics. Each month, lenders will randomly select a small number of fresh delinquencies to push through the system as quickly as possible. If some of the herd are executed quickly while others are allowed to squat indefinitely, it creates uncertainty. This uncertainty keeps some paying rather than play Russian roulette.

The carrot lenders dangle in front of loan owners comes through rumors of principal reduction windfalls. Like the random executions of freshly delinquent borrowers, a very small number of principal reductions given to loan owners who are doing what lenders want -- making all payments -- provides the lottery-style false hope to motivate the masses. Today's featured article is part of the public relations campaign lenders use to get the word out concerning the principal reduction lottery windfall ostensibly available to loan owners who dutifully make their payments.

If someone somewhere got a principal reduction, it could happen to anyone. I hope nobody is holding their breath.

Big Banks Easing Terms on Loans Deemed as Risks

By DAVID STREITFELD
Published: July 2, 2011

As millions of Americans struggle in foreclosure with little hope of relief, big banks are going to borrowers who are not even in default and cutting their debt or easing the mortgage terms, sometimes with no questions asked.

The ultimate debtors fantasy: money for nothing.

Two of the nation’s biggest lenders, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, are quietly modifying loans for tens of thousands of borrowers who have not asked for help but whom the banks deem to be at special risk.

Rula Giosmas is one of the beneficiaries. Last year she received a letter from Chase saying it was cutting in half the amount she owed on her condominium.

Ms. Giosmas, who lives in Miami, was not in default on her $300,000 loan. She did not understand why she would receive this gift — although she wasted no time in taking it.

Ms. Giosmas received the gift because Chase probably recognized she was one of the last who didn't strategically default, and based on their analysis, there was a very high probability of her doing so in the future. The likely reduced her balance to a level that reduced their loss from what it would have been if Chase had to foreclose and resell another REO. Plus, they could then get this story written.

Banks are proactively overhauling loans for borrowers like Ms. Giosmas who have so-called pay option adjustable rate mortgages, which were popular in the wild late stages of the housing boom but which banks now view as potentially troublesome.

Before Chase shaved $150,000 off her mortgage, Ms. Giosmas owed much more on her place than it was worth. It was a fate she shared with a quarter of all homeowners with mortgages across the nation. Being underwater, as it is called, can prevent these owners from moving and taking new jobs, and places the households at greater risk of foreclosure.

“It’s a huge problem,” said the economist Sam Khater. “Reducing negative equity would spark a housing recovery.”

Giving away free money will not spark a housing recovery. It would however reward those who overborrowed under stupid terms which would encourage imprudent borrowing again in the future.

While many homeowners desperately need help to keep their homes and cannot get it, the borrowers getting unsolicited relief from Chase sometimes suspect a trick. Cutting loan balances, even for loans in default, is supposedly so rare that Federal Reserve economists wrote in a paper in March that “we could find no evidence that any lender was actually reducing principal” on mortgages.

Principal forgiveness is rare because it is really stupid. Rumors of principal reduction have been used by lenders in the past to get borrowers to contact them to try to work out loan modifications, but lenders don't want to start reducing principal because all of their customers would ask for it. Besides, foreclosure is a superior form of principal reduction because the borrower has consequences for their foolish borrowing.

“I used to say every day, ‘Why doesn’t anyone get rewarded for doing the right thing and paying their bills on time?’ ” said Ms. Giosmas, who is an acupuncturist and real estate investor. “And I got rewarded.”

No, Ms. Giosmas got rewarded for taking out a very foolish loan at the worst possible time. It encourages the worst form of borrower stupidity. Lenders are happy to have this framed as a reward for making payments on time in hopes that others will do the same. They couldn't have scripted her comments any better.

Option ARM loans like Ms. Giosmas’s gave borrowers the option of skipping the principal payment and some of the interest payment for an introductory period of several years. The unpaid balances would be added to the body of the loan.

Bank of America and Chase inherited their portfolios of option ARMs when they bought troubled lenders during the housing crash.

Chase, which declined to comment on its program, got $50 billion in option ARM loans when it bought Washington Mutual in 2008. The lender, which said last fall that it had dealt with 22,000 option ARM loans with an unpaid principal balance of $8 billion, still has $33 billion of them in its portfolio.

I foresee some major write-downs still to come.

Bank of America acquired a portfolio of 550,000 option ARMs from its purchase of Countrywide Financial in 2008. The lender said more than 200,000 had been converted to more stable mortgages.

Dan B. Frahm, a spokesman for Bank of America, said it was using every technique short of principal reduction to remake its loans, including waiving prepayment penalties, refinancing, lowering the interest rate, postponing some of the balance and extending the term.

“By proactively contacting pay option ARM customers and discussing other products with better options for long-term, affordable payments, we hope to prevent customers from reaching a point where they struggle to make their payments,” Mr. Frahm said.

Chase, Bank of America and the other big lenders are negotiating with the Obama administration and the nation’s attorneys general over foreclosures. Debt forgiveness and the moral hazard question of who deserves to be helped are among the most contentious issues.

These news stories make moral hazard sound like some minor inconvenience when it is the core of the problem. If you give away money, it isn't a loan anymore, it is welfare going to the least deserving.

The banks say cutting mortgage balances would be unfair to borrowers who remain current as well as impractical because so many loans are securitized into pools owned by investors. Bank of America’s chief executive, Brian T. Moynihan, told the attorneys general in April that cutting principal for current borrowers would send the wrong message to all those who have struggled to pay their bills. His counterpart at Chase, Jamie Dimon, bluntly said it was “off the table.”

Good. It should be off the table. Foreclosure and bankruptcy are viable alternatives which provide consequences to the borrower for their behavior. Without consequences, no borrower would exercise any judgment or self control when considering a loan. Loans become free money for the taking.

Having an option ARM loan, however, apparently qualifies the borrower for special help. The loans, with their low initial payments and “teaser” interest rates, were immediately popular with buyers who could not afford or did not want to pay the soaring prices on houses. The problem was, eventually the rate would reset or the loan balance would have to be paid in full. “Nightmare Mortgages” they were called in a 2006 BusinessWeek cover piece.

Option ARMs were never quite as bad as predicted, partly because the crisis pushed down interest rates so far that the resets were relatively mild. Many owners did default on them, but others, like Ms. Giosmas, were quite happy to pay less for years than they would have under a conventional loan. She used option ARMs on her investment properties too.

“They saved me,” she said. “Why would I want to pay a lot more every month? I’d rather have it in my pocket.”

Does anyone else see the insanity being encouraged here? This woman believed she was making a wise financial decision using an Option ARM, and the bank is reinforcing this belief by giving her a principal reduction. Borrowers incentives should be to pay down debt to reduce risk for both the lender and the borrower. If borrowers have the mindset to maximize their debt and minimize their payments, that's how Ponzi schemes are born. Our housing market will never find stability under those terms.

The concern the banks are showing for those who might get in trouble contrasts sharply with their efforts toward those already foreclosed. Bank of America and Chase were penalized last month by regulators for doing a poor job modifying mortgages in default.

Adam J. Levitin, a Georgetown University law professor, said these little-publicized programs were more evidence that the banks were behaving in contradictory and often maddening ways.

“Loan modifications that should be happening aren’t, while loan modifications that shouldn’t be happening are,” he said. “Homeowners of any sort, whether current or in default, would rightly be confused and angry by this.”

Borrowers who borrowed prudently and make their loan payments should be the most outraged by principal reductions. They aren't getting any free money from the banks; however, their foolish neighbors who borrowed irresponsibly are obtaining windfalls.

The homeowners getting new loans, however, are quite pleased. In effect, the banks are paying the debt these owners accrued as the housing market plunged.

Ms. Giosmas bought her two-bedroom, two-bath apartment north of downtown Miami for $359,000 in early 2006, according to real estate records. She made a large down payment, but because each month she paid less than was necessary to pay off the loan, her debt swelled to about $300,000.

Meanwhile, the value of the apartment nosedived. By the time Ms. Giosmas got the letter from Chase, the condominium was worth less than half what she paid. “I would not have defaulted,” she said. “But they don’t know that.”

The letter, which Ms. Giosmas remembers as brief and “totally vague,” said Chase was cutting her principal by $150,000 while raising her interest rate to about 5 percent. Her payments would stay roughly the same.

A few months ago, Ms. Giosmas sold the place for $170,000, making a small profit. Having a loan that her lender considered toxic, she said, “turned out to be a blessing in disguise.”

Everyone should take out toxic loans, right? This woman got a principal reduction and actually made money after the sale, all because she took out the worst loan imaginable at the worst possible time and made only the minimum payment. Lenders are telling borrowers they can get free money if they borrow imprudently enough. What impact will that have?

The real message lenders are trying to send is aimed at the masses: keep making your payments, and you may also receive free money from the bank. Of course, the odds are about the same as playing the lottery, but as lottery sales attest to, if there is a chance, many will be willing to play.

Too late to Ponzi

Today's featured property was purchased on 10/19/2005 for $504,500. The original loan information isn't in my records. However, on 10/23/2007, these owners refinanced with a $480,000 first mortgage, and on 12/6/2007 they obtained a $59,950 HELOC. If they took the HELOC money, they got $30,450 in booty despite buying so close to the peak. They got to squat for about a year.

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 10/29/2010 
Document Type: Notice of Sale  

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 02/25/2010 
Document Type: Notice of Default

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This property is available for sale via the MLS.
Please contact Shevy Akason, #01836707 
949.769.1599
sales@idealhomebrokers.com

Irvine House Address ...  37 LONG Mdw #15 Irvine, CA 92620   
Resale House Price ...... $374,900

Beds:  2
Baths:  2
Sq. Ft.:  1567
$239/SF
Property Type: Residential, Condominium
Style: One Level, Contemporary
Year Built:  2006
Community:  0
County:  Orange
MLS#:  P779996
Source:  SoCalMLS
Status:  Active
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WOW!! WOW!! GEORGEOUS CONDO IN FANTASTIC IRVINE NEIGHBORHOOD. THIS CONDO IS LIGHT, BRIGHT, OPEN AND SPACIOUS. VERY NICE KITCHEN WITH LARGE ISLAND AND TILED COUNTERTOPS. CONVENIENT LAUNDRY ROOM WITH PLENTY OF STORAGE SPACE. LARGE MASTER BEDROOM AND BATHROOM. BATH HAS A DOUBLE SINK AND SEPARATE SHOWER AND BATHTUB. THERE PLENTY OF STORAGE SPACE. ATTACHED GARAGE. COMPLEX OFFERS ASSOCIATION POOL AND SPA. BASKETBALL/TENNIS COURTS AND SOCCER/BASEBALL FIELDS ARE ALL WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE. EASY ACCESS TO SEVERAL MAJOR FREEWAYS AND LOCATED NEAR SEVERAL SHOPPING CENTERS/MALLS. THIS IS TRULY A MUST SEE. COME AND TAKE A LOOK BEFORE ITS GONE.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proprietary IHB commentary and analysis

The total cost of ownership of $2,273 is near rental parity. Generally, condos should trade at a discount to rental parity, but a 2005 condo in Woodbury will be perceived as a bargain by someone looking to live in that community.

Resale Home Price ......  $374,900
House Purchase Price … $504,500
House Purchase Date .... 10/19/2005

Net Gain (Loss) .......... ($152,094)
Percent Change .......... -30.1%
Annual Appreciation … -5.1%

Cost of Home Ownership
-------------------------------------------------
$374,900 .......... Asking Price
$13,122 .......... 3.5% Down FHA Financing
4.59% ............... Mortgage Interest Rate
$361,778 .......... 30-Year Mortgage
$79,392 .......... Income Requirement 

$1,852 .......... Monthly Mortgage Payment 
$325 .......... Property Tax (@1.04%)
$0 .......... Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)
$78 .......... Homeowners Insurance (@ 0.25%)
$416 .......... Private Mortgage Insurance
$280 .......... Homeowners Association Fees
============================================
$2,952 .......... Monthly Cash Outlays

-$299 .......... Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)
-$469 .......... Equity Hidden in Payment (Amortization)
$23 .......... Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)
$67 .......... Maintenance and Replacement Reserves
============================================
$2,273 .......... Monthly Cost of Ownership 

Cash Acquisition Demands
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$3,749 .......... Furnishing and Move In @1%
$3,749 .......... Closing Costs @1%
$3,618 ............ Interest Points @1% of Loan
$13,122 .......... Down Payment
============================================
$24,237 .......... Total Cash Costs
$34,800 ............ Emergency Cash Reserves
============================================
$59,037 .......... Total Savings Needed
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


real estate home sales


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Irvine Housing Blog

Irvine Housing Blog

Link to Irvine Housing Blog

Irvine home sales down 11%, OC down 14%

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 03:30 AM PDT

Irvine home sales are down 11% while the rest of Orange County is down 14% over last year.

Irvine Home Address ... 64 EAGLE Pt #34 Irvine, CA 92604
Resale Home Price ......  $219,900

 

Cares of the past are behind
Nowhere to go but I'll find
Just where the trail will wind
Drifting along with the tumbling tumbleweeds.

Sons Of The Pioneers -- Tumbling Tumbleweeds

Irvine homebuying tumbles 11%

By JONATHAN LANSNER -- June 27, 2011

Homebuying in Irvine is slowing down by the freshest math.

For the 22 business days ending June 7 – new stats from DataQuick — Irvine homebuying shapes up like this by ZIP …

  •     Citywide sales totaled 287 – that's down 37 purchases or 11.4% vs. a year ago. Countywide, sales were down 15.4% vs. a year earlier.
  •     Irvine home sales were 10.0% of the countywide market in the latest period vs. 9.6% in the year-ago period.
  •     Of Irvine's 8 ZIP codes, 3 had sales gains vs. a year ago while 2 had a gain in their median selling price vs. a year ago.
  •     Medians within the city's ZIPs ran from $362,500 to $1,016,500 – while the price gap was $412,000 to $977,500 a year ago.
  •     2 of these 8 ZIP codes beat the -2.8% overall performance of the countywide median for the past year.

Did Orange County fair any better than Irvine?

Housing slump zaps all corners of O.C.

By JONATHAN LANSNER -- July 3, 2011

From beach to foothills, from the L.A. border to Camp Pendleton, people are buying fewer Orange County homes than a year ago when a tax break was expiring for house shoppers.

For the 22 business days ending June 15 – freshest numbers from DataQuick — our region-by-region analysis of local real estate trends finds Orange County homebuying slicing up by geography this way …

  • Mid-county ZIPs: Median selling price $344,500 – had 723 sales, down 25% from a year ago. In these 25 ZIPs, the median price change was off 3.8% vs. a year ago. Example: 16% dip in Santa Ana home sales in year
  • Beach cities: 484 homes sold in 17 ZIP codes in the most recent period, down 17% from a year ago. Median selling price? $695,000 in these 17 ZIPs. Median price change? Down 9.1% vs. a year ago.Example: South Coast home sales down 24% over year
  • North-inland: 646 homes sold in this most recent period, off 16% from a year ago. Median selling price? $425,000 in these 22 ZIPs. Median price change? Down 3.2% vs. a year ago. Example: 38% dip in Buena Park home sales
  • South inland: Median selling price $457,875 – had 859 sales, down 13% from a year ago. In these 19 ZIPs, median price change was down 10.1% vs. a year ago. Example: Ladera Ranch home sales tumble 31%

Also …

  • Combined, total homes sales in ZIPs in the north and mid-section of Orange County were -21.3% vs. a year ago as homebuying the rest of the county ran -14.7% vs. 12 months earlier.
  • North/mid-county homes accounted for 50% of residences sold in the most recent period vs. 52% a year ago.
  • All told, countywide sales were -16% vs. a year ago. The median selling price was -3% in the past year.

The good news is that next years numbers will look great by comparison.

10% off its early 2003 purchase price

The carnage at the low end of the market is truly remarkable. Today's featured property was purchased in early 2003 for $240,000, and now it is being offered in mid 2011 for $219,000.

The former owner was a typical Ponzi who put nothing down and milked the property for $84,000 before the ATM ran dry. His final loan was a $324,000 Option ARM with a 1.4% teaser rate.

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 02/02/2011 
Document Type: Notice of Sale   

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 08/02/2010 
Document Type: Notice of Default

There aren't too many no-money-down Ponzis that have survived to 2011. I suppose this guy should be commended for hanging on so long... not.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This property is available for sale via the MLS.
Please contact Shevy Akason, #01836707 
949.769.1599
sales@idealhomebrokers.com



Irvine House Address ...  64 EAGLE Pt #34 Irvine, CA 92604
Resale House Price ......  $219,900

Beds:  2
Baths:  1
Sq. Ft.:  954
$231/SF
Property Type: Residential, Condominium
Style: One Level, Traditional
Year Built:  1978
Community:  0
County:  Orange
MLS#:  S651530
Source:  SoCalMLS
Status:  Active
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nice upper-level condo with nice-size kitchen, balcony and inside laundry. Walking distance to Irvine Valley College, parks, schools, shopping, Oak Creek Golf Course and North Lake. Great for investor or first-time buyer!
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proprietary IHB commentary and analysis 

This property barely breaks even for an owner occupant compared to a comparable rental. The only "investor" that would be interested in this property is a kool aid intoxicated one who is betting on appreciation that isn't going to happen for a while.

Resale Home Price ......  $219,900
House Purchase Price … $240,000
House Purchase Date .... 4/2/2003

Net Gain (Loss) .......... ($33,294)
Percent Change .......... -13.9%
Annual Appreciation … -1.0%

Cost of Home Ownership
-------------------------------------------------
$219,900 .......... Asking Price
$7,697 .......... 3.5% Down FHA Financing
4.49% ............... Mortgage Interest Rate
$212,204 .......... 30-Year Mortgage
$46,026 .......... Income Requirement 

$1,074 .......... Monthly Mortgage Payment 
$191 .......... Property Tax (@1.04%)
$0 .......... Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)
$46 .......... Homeowners Insurance (@ 0.25%)
$244 .......... Private Mortgage Insurance
$40 .......... Homeowners Association Fees
============================================
$1,594 .......... Monthly Cash Outlays

-$98 .......... Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)
-$280 .......... Equity Hidden in Payment (Amortization)
$13 .......... Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)
$47 .......... Maintenance and Replacement Reserves
============================================
$1,276 .......... Monthly Cost of Ownership 

Cash Acquisition Demands
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$2,199 .......... Furnishing and Move In @1%
$2,199 .......... Closing Costs @1%
$2,122 ............ Interest Points @1% of Loan
$7,697 .......... Down Payment
============================================
$14,217 .......... Total Cash Costs
$19,500 ............ Emergency Cash Reserves
============================================
$33,717 .......... Total Savings Needed
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Enjoy your fourth of July holiday!


real estate home sales


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